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Thanks to the reforms of the last two
decades and more, China’s health care re-
sources have multiplied. Medical technolo-
gies, capacity, and proficiency have im-
proved following the growth of human
resources, increase in hardware input and
greater opening up to the outside world. In
the meantime, health care policies have un-
dergone several reforms. Still, in the rating
by WHO of public health systems of the 191
UN member nations in 2000, the overall sta-
tus of China’s health care and sanitation was
ranked 144th. In terms of the equitable fi-
nancing of national health care, China stood
the last but three of all the 191 member
nations, preceding only Brazil, Burma and
Sierra Leone. China now reverberates with
a huge public outcry — coming not only from
the urban but also the rural areas — against
the inequity and excessive cost imposed by
the existing system of medical care — a sys-
tem that is decried almost by everybody. The
unconscionable behavior of medical circles
is being criticized nationwide. Social life in
China is permeated by an animosity between
the general public and medical circles. Since
they have lost public trust, any new reform
proposals for the health care system will have
difficulty winning over and appealing to the
public.
We can say that the health care issues
now confronting us are no long in any way
a technical problem or one of structure and
total quantity in the economic sense. They
are more of a problem of social health care
in the sense of social policy. The whole of
society is clamoring with one voice for so-
cial justice and equity. In this grave situation,
the time is ripe to seek a breakthrough in a
new developmental model and strategies for
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future health care reform through compre-
hensive discussion and debate.
This paper seeks to enrich the ongoing
discussion from the perspective of gover-
nance and regulation.
I. Why Has the Question of “Regula-
tion” Come Up?
In recent years, research findings re-
lating to China’s health care system have
proliferated. However, when it comes to the
issue of monitoring, such findings are uni-
formly stereotyped in that they remain firmly
committed to a simplistic linear approach and
concentrate only on who should be doing
the monitoring. Moreover, most findings
criticize the government as the main culprit
in the failure of monitoring. They broach the
topic of monitoring but leave out such ques-
tions as “What is monitoring?” “How should
it be carried out?” How can such findings
help promote China’s health care reform?
We cannot discuss monitoring without
bringing in governance and regulation. Gov-
ernance hinges on “subjects.” Different sub-
jects call for different scope, methods, and
principles of governance. “Regulation” means
managing in accordance with a system of
regulations. What is pivotal here is the legal
status of such a system. It is necessary to
formulate clear, quantifiable, and workable
objectives and procedures. While governance
relies on regulation for realizing the subjects’
intentions and policy goals, regulation needs
a rationalized “framework of governance” to
work. When governance is combined with
regulation, the quality of public service will
be further enhanced. In recent years regula-
tion has been drawing more intensive atten-
tion from the international community. This
has led to much progress in research in such
fields as the subjects, goals, processes, and
methods of regulation.
Regulation differs from monitoring or
oversight, which is simply a function. Al-
though monitoring as a function can be per-
formed by any individual or organization, it
is more often taken for granted that it is a
task incumbent upon government, whereas
regulation is management enforced through
the legislative system and is thus at the high-
est level of standardization. From the per-
spective of regulation, monitoring in the first
place requires the delegation of authority and
clearly defined limits to authority. A great
number of monitoring tasks can be carried
out only by specialized management agencies.
It is only when a specialized management
agency acts as a third party within the bounds
of its formal authority, and has supervisory
authority and corresponding responsibilities
in relation to all stakeholders, that the require-
ments of regulation are met.
In the field of health care, the fact that
the objects of regulation, namely hospitals
and practitioners, have very much the ad-
vantage in terms of information places regu-
lators under considerable pressure. The ex-
ecution of regulation in this field calls for a
much higher level of professionalism than in
any other, including other fields of public
service. It requires that the regulators should
be independent within the governance
framework, should be highly expert, and
should have adequate resource inputs.
In raising the topic of regulation, we need
to begin with the double-track price system.
The so-called “double-track price system”
refers to the situation where on the one hand,
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the government decrees that hospitals offer
basic health care services to the public at
prices lower than the actual costs of such
services so as to maintain social stability and
fairness, while on the other, the government
allows hospitals to offset the losses arising
from this practice through self-determined
pricing of any new treatment or medicine in
order to improve operating efficiency. This
“double-track price system” was introduced
nationwide over two decades ago. All health
care institutions across China — from large
and comprehensive urban hospitals to small
township health centers — have owed their
survival and growth to the “double-track
price system.”
It is apparent that the system was en-
gendered by a “dual-goal project” with con-
flicting goals. It involves an attempt to up-
hold social equity by providing low-priced
basic health care services while making prof-
its from non-basic health care services. These
diverse goals call for diverse forms of
regulation, but these diverse forms of regu-
lation have to be applied to one and the same
health care institution or health care worker.
Requiring doctors to prescribe nothing
but basic medicines for their patients or to
issue no prescriptions, or fewer prescrip-
tions, for high-profit medicines, amounts to
asking doctors and hospitals to act against
their own interests. If hospitals are to survive,
they have to sell high-profit drugs and offer
high-cost medical consultations. Less than
twenty years ago, local government’s annual
budgetary appropriations to hospitals — es-
pecially comprehensive urban hospitals —
in China was already reduced to only three
to five percent of the total sum of salaries,
not including the hospital’s regular operational
costs. If we take the operational costs into
consideration, the percentage of government
can be regarded as zero. This gives great
impetus to over-servicing. As mentioned
above, there is an information disparity be-
tween the providers and the consumers of
health care services. The former has the ad-
vantage in terms of information. In many
cases, demand is induced by doctors and
hospitals rather than coming from patients.
Impelled by the lucrative practice of prescrib-
ing high-cost medicines or peddling pharma-
ceutical products, the cost of health care
service has been rising at an alarming rate.
The “double-track price system” was
originally intended to give free rein to hospi-
tals in fixing the prices of new medicines
and therapeutic equipment that are unrelated
to basic health care services. This was to
balance the objectives of providing basic
health care service to the middle and lower
social strata with that of harvesting revenue
from the health care services offered to those
capable of paying for them. This wishful
thinking has gone badly astray in practice.
The basic health care services provided
by medical institutions under the “double-
track price system” have demonstrated an
obvious side effect that contradicts the ini-
tial policy intent. The situation is even worse
in poorly equipped, remote, and grassroots-
level hospitals. Generally speaking, so long
as lower-end hospitals maintain a certain
price differential between themselves and
high-end hospitals, they too can climb on the
price rise bandwagon. People who can af-
ford them prefer high-end hospitals due to
the quality of their services. This means that
inferior hospitals have fewer patients, and
so fleece everyone who comes through the
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door. Consequently, farmers who use lower-
end services are forced to bear the costs of
high-end consumption and price rises. Thus,
rather than improving the quality and widen-
ing the  coverage of bas ic health care
services, the “double-track price system” is
making ordinary people’s access to the health
care system more difficult and seriously un-
dermining social equity.
The “double-track price system” has
been in practice for over two decades and
has fully demonstrated its negative aspects.
According to “An Analytical Report on the
3rd Nationwide Health Care Survey,” in the
ten years from 1993 to 2003, the percentage
of persons confined to bed by illness in all
the income groups in China’s urban areas
rose by nearly half, while the percentage of
those seeking medical advice and being hos-
pitalized continually for two consecutive
weeks fell by nearly half in the same period.
The only exception was that the percentage
of persons who were hospitalized in the high-
est income group rose slightly over the
period. The drastic slump indicates an in-
creasingly worsening situation in which pa-
tients put off obtaining health care services,
while there has been a corresponding rise in
serious illnesses (those confined to bed).
Why did the government adopt the
“double-track price system” in spite of its
salient defects?
Table 1 Need for and actual use of health care services among China’s city and town
population classified into 5 income levels
Source: Health Statistics and Information Center of under MPH, Examining China’s Health care services: An
Analytical Report on the 3rd Nationwide Health Care Survey, Peking Union Medical College Press,
2004, pp. 87-88.
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For the government, this institutional
arrangement was mainly motivated by finan-
cial considerations. At the time the govern-
ment lacked financial muscle and could not
take on the continually climbing health care
costs caused by the upswing of market
prices in general. In such circumstances, the
government had no choice but to allow hos-
pitals to offer high-profit services on their
own initiative, providing them with a source
of income in well-off patients in addition to
their fiscal appropriations. This would cover
the deficit caused by the provision of basic
health care services at a low price. Moreover,
the policy was also influenced by the fact
that at the time the state was relinquishing
part of its control over state-owned enter-
prises and especially by the new pricing
policy, i.e., the state exercises general pric-
ing control over important products only,
leaving the pricing of ordinary products to
the market. It has only been in the last two
years that our society reached a consensus
that such public goods as health care and
education are not private goods and cannot
be subject to arbitrary market prices.
However, whether at the time when this
policy was introduced or now, the “double-
track price system” survives because it meets
the needs of government as well as those of
hospitals. Hospitals want to make money and
the government wants to save money, while
at the same time atta ining equity and
efficiency. However, the government has
only been concerned with balancing its books
and achieving its policy goals as quickly as
possible, without taking into account the fact
that employing the “double-track price sys-
tem” to accomplish its dual goals was ask-
ing too much of the governance and regula-
tion of health care services. This was im-
possible for China to achieve in the condi-
tions prevailing over twenty years ago, and
this remains the case even today. Because,
over the last twenty plus years of health
reform, the government has been unaware
of the need for and undecided over the es-
tablishment of an efficient governance and
regulatory system, leaving the drawbacks to
fester unchecked. Hospitals in China have
already gone too far along the path of “sub-
sidizing basic health care by prescribing high-
priced drugs.” This chronic malfunction has
led to today’s dilemma.
A great number of public hospitals have
been encroaching upon the interests of the
general public by outmaneuvering the
“double-track price system.” Although ev-
erybody has witnessed and condemned this
phenomenon, it seems nobody can do any-
thing about it. Why? In our opinion, this
stems from the fact that we have little knowl-
edge of and little comfidence in governance
and regulation in the domain of public health
care services . When confronting the
problem, everybody looks to the government,
expecting it to change its policy, fix the price
of medicines, and place requirements on
hospitals. However, they don’t have many
ideas about how government should regu-
late hospitals, or what sort of framework or
measures it should employ. Before the gov-
ernment has had the chance to understand
the complexity of the regulatory endeavor
or make decisions about it, public opinion
and academic research have already leapt into
the fray with questions of interest groups
and bureaucratism. In fact, governance and
regulation is a highly specialized field that can
and must be researched independently. So
122 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Autumn 2006
far China has been lacking in such studies.
Hence we have no choice but to strengthen
our study of the issue and learn both from
other countries’ experience and our own.
II. Health Care’s Present Dilemma
Stems from the Absence of Gover-
nance and Regulation
A lot of policies and projects aimed at
promoting reform of health care have ap-
peared in the last ten years, but most have
not been treated seriously. For example, in
October 2002, the State Council promulgated
a resolution on improving health care work
in rural areas. The resolution deals with prob-
lems in seven categories and contains twenty-
five articles. Its essence was that farmers
should receive guaranteed basic health care
through systematic and comprehensive re-
form of the health care network, personnel,
system and institutional arrangements. Of the
twenty-five articles, only three deal with es-
tablishing a new rural cooperative health care
system that insures against severe illness or
with special medical assistance for poor ru-
ral families. In the three years following, these
were the only two initiatives to be designed
and implemented, and they were only incre-
mental additions to what already existed. The
other proposals, such as “strengthening dis-
ease prevention in rural areas and adhering
to the policy of giving priority to prevention,”
“promoting reform in township (or town)
clinics,” “creating a socialized rural sanita-
tion and health care network,” and “improv-
ing the monitoring of health services in rural
areas according to law” — were mostly
shelved. This accounts for the fact that even
though the central government used all its
executive powers in an unprecedented ef-
fort to create a new rural cooperative health
care system, its efforts actually went
nowhere.
In the course of the debate across the
country, a lot of insightful ideas have emerged
as to the causes of these problems. Yet we
believe that given actual social circum-
stances, unless governance and regulation are
given a central role, not only will our present
health care problems be exacerbated, but the
government’s moves to adapt its existing
policies to suit the circumstances will be ren-
dered meaningless or even backfire. Only
through governance and regulation can good
institutions and policies be protected; other-
wise harmful institutions and policies will play
havoc with our society.
To deepen understanding of what is
meant by governance and regulation, we have
summarized under five headings society’s
views on the causes underlying our health
care problems and discussed them from the
viewpoint of governance and regulation.
1. Insufficient inputs
According to this view, it is because of
insufficient investment in health care that the
government has had to give free rein to medi-
cal institutions’ making profits to balance
their budgets.1  As a result, the general pub-
lic has been left to acquiesce in their
aberrations. However, would these distor-
tions be reversed if investment were poured
into medical institutions? If they had adequate
government appropriations, would they then
be willing to refrain from making profits ei-
ther for themselves or individuals through
expensive consultations or medicines? In the
last two years, the state has provided gener-
ous support and continuing investment for
SPECIAL ISSUE: REFORM OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 123
both medical institutions at the bottom and
the rural cooperative health care system.
However, li ttle has come out of such
investments. Moreover, in the absence of
governance and regulation, it is quite pos-
sible that the more abundant the input, the
further the deviation from the policy goal.
For example, the government has in recent
years directly funded township hospitals or
village clinics. However most village clinics
now exist only in name, with village doctors
becoming in word and deed independent ac-
tors who make a living subsidizing their medi-
cal services by the sale of high-cost drugs.
As for town and township hospitals, since
most of their proceeds come from the
market, they choose to invest as much as
possible in facilities and buildings, disregard-
ing the health of the rural population. This
has resulted in subjecting the rural popula-
tion to a heavier financial burden arising from
the increasing cost of these institutions. This
phenomenon is widespread today, but the
relevant authorities only announce how much
the government has invested in rural areas,
without redressing these obvious departures
from policy objectives and goals.
2. Low coverage of medical-service
insurance
This view also talks about insufficient
inputs, but it believes that responsibility for
financing lies not only with the government
but also with communities and individuals.
We agree with widening the coverage of
medical insurance, but can this widening
alone definitely solve the problem? If enlarg-
ing the coverage of medical insurance is in-
tended simply as a means of pooling funds
so as to relieve some of the government’s
financial burden, leaving the regulation prob-
lem unsolved, it will not necessarily bring
fair benefits to those insured.
Some of the advocates of this view be-
lieve that widened coverage would help public
medical insurance agencies monitor medical
institutions and doctors. In other words, as
a third party in the chain of health care
services, such agencies would be able to
oversee the conduct of medical institutions
or practitioners. On this point, they demon-
strate an understanding of the need for regu-
lating health care services. However, at
present all that public medical insurance agen-
cies monitor is macro-statistics; they have
no way of controlling the desires of millions
of individuals or the concrete actions of doc-
tors even if something goes wrong, because
the evidence is so elusive. Obviously, this is
not a question of whether monitoring is
necessary, but of how it is to be implemented.
3. The Unreasonable price of medicine
and medical equipment
Advocates of this view believe the key
problem lies with distribution, namely how
to divide up the health resources pie. In us-
ing the term “divide up” we are making a
distinction between the division and alloca-
tion of resources. The resources are divided
among directly or indirectly interested par-
ties — such as hospitals, medical practi-
tioners, dealers in pharmaceutical products,
manufacturers of medical apparatus and
instruments, distribution agents, and even the
government department in charge of pricing
and agencies supervising sanitation and me-
dicinal products. The only people excluded
from the division are the patients.
In such circumstances, when hospitals
are ordered to lower medicine prices, they
can raise fees for consultations, diagnosis,
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etc. in response, because the mechanism of
“dividing up the resources” works like a
seesaw. If one side goes down the other goes
up. Under the premise of a fixed budget and
profit maximization in the absence of valid
regulation, a reduction in the prices of medi-
cines or consultations will undoubtedly lead
to an increase in fees for diagnosis or
treatment. How then can medical resources
be divided and shared equitably among the
parties concerned? We simply do not know.
However, from the perspective of regulation,
centralization rather than decentralization of
the supervising authority is one of the regu-
latory principles. In the absence of an au-
thoritative organization able to make judg-
ments and decisions and implement them
consistently, there would be chaotic strife
among different interest groups. In such a
case public interests are destined to suffer.
Only a proper governance framework and
regulatory system can provide a fair and rea-
sonable dialogue between different interest
groups and a level playing field.
It can be seen that the regulatory per-
spective can throw light on the apparently
technical problem of the so-called conflict
between the total amount of health care re-
sources and their structure.
4. A Dysfunctional public hospital sys-
tem
This view argues that the current sys-
tem of decentralization of operations and re-
sponsibilities to various departments is a
great obstacle to the development of health
care in China. Over the years, China’s ad-
ministrative hierarchy has been epitomized
in the saying: “A thousand threads above, a
needle point below.” Placed under the joint
jurisdiction of a series of government admin-
istrative bodies, local government organiza-
tions are chastised at every turn by their con-
tending superiors. Since a hospital is a spe-
cialized and complex institution, the prob-
lem is even more serious there. A public
hospital’s capital construction and fixed as-
sets are handled by the development and re-
form commission of the local government;
budgetary subsidies come under its financial
office; appointment or removal of the head
of the hospital comes under the local Chi-
nese Communist Party organization depart-
ment; and the local public health office is in
charge of approving and monitoring of the
medical profession and technology. Since
leadership or jurisdiction over public hospi-
tals is divided among so many areas, any of
them can put themselves forward as the lead-
ership or superior authority of the hospital,
which has to bow to every directive issued
by any of them. Since the hospital’s person-
nel matters ,  medical apparatus  and
instruments, and policy formulation are con-
trolled by the local government, a public hos-
pital is fully justified if it chooses not to hold
itself accountable for its own acts. In such
circumstances, neither the mechanism of
incentive nor that of restraint can function
properly.
From the regulatory point of view, the
trouble here lies in the fact that the powers
and duties that should have belonged to a
public hospital, as an entity in its own right,
are now confused with third party moni-
toring. To put it another way, things such as
personnel management and distribution that
should naturally have been under the juris-
diction of a public hospital are withheld from
it, while things such as standardization of
health care procedures,  prescription
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procedures, and control of quality that should
be regulated have either been transferred to
public hospitals or left unheeded by all par-
ties concerned. To sum up, the powers and
functions of a public hospital as a health care
entity have been confused with the regula-
tory function of monitoring.
5. Poor monitoring by health care ad-
ministrative bodies
Some insightful observers have al-
ready pointed out that the authorities in charge
of the health care sector have not yet for-
mulated or enacted feasible rules for moni-
toring medical institutions across the country,
have never created an assessment system
suitable for evaluating the performance of
individual medical institutions, have not es-
tablished a procedure for scrutinizing the per-
formance of heads of public hospitals, and
have never disciplined anyone for the shame-
ful bribe-taking and kickbacks that have long
been the scourge of our public hospitals. At
the same time, the development of profes-
sional associations has been lagging behind.
Neither doctors’ associations nor hospital
leagues have grown to be really independent
organizations. Medical circles as a whole still
exhibit an unwillingness to embrace self-
discipline.
The factors behind this situation are
complex. One is that medical institutions of-
ten have close ties and common interests with
public health departments in terms  of
personnel, finance and history. Another is
that medical institutions are now like the pre-
reform state-owned enterprises, keeping
people on their books to maintain stability.
Health departments and hospitals not only
safeguard their common interests but also
contribute to political stability. Yet another
factor is that since public hospitals have
multiple leadership, health authorities alone
have no way of controlling them.
From the regulatory point of view, it is
evident that public medical institutions have
never been able to act as a full agent of the
owner (the state). Thus public health depart-
ments have had to take their place. Though
public medical institutions are not inde-
pendent, they have to behave independently
to look after their own interests through
market exchanges and thus become inter-
ests in themselves. However, an interest en-
tity without full independence is quite
formidable, because no matter what goes
wrong, it can always shuffle off its respon-
sibilities to others. In this regard, it is like
state-owned enterprises prior to reform.
Thus some people have recommended
reform of the ownership of public medical
institutions. One is the categorization of all
hospitals into non-profit and for-profit. This
expedient aims at conferring a fully inde-
pendent identity on all hospitals. However,
registering a hospital under one of these
categories and making it nominally a legal
person does not mean that the hospital in
question really acquires the full status of an
independent actor (most hospitals in China
are already registered as legal persons).
Moreover, if hospitals acquire independence
and become entities with legally protected
interests, but regulation fails to keep up with
these developments, the fierce scramble for
profits we see today may well be exacer-
bated. Effective regulation presupposes that
the institution to be regulated behaves ratio-
nally and consistently and is not saying one
thing and doing another. A hospital may not
need independence in the sense of being a
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legal person, but it needs to have an inde-
pendent legal status, do what it says it will,
and be able to take legal responsibility for its
behavior.
Another question is “Who is most suit-
able to be in charge of regulation?” The pub-
lic health department? As part of government,
its main functions are planning and policy
implementation, while regulation is a highly
specialized task. To properly fulfill the task
requires the exclusion of all involvement with
interested parties. The public health depart-
ment is one of the parties with a direct inter-
est in health care institutions. Moreover, in
China relationships within the system are
linked to policy. The two sides are linked by
common interests. Therefore, however one
looks at it, the public health department is
not a suitable regulator. The regulator needs
to be established independently, especially in
China. In order to protect public interest,
public health departments should be isolated
from the task of regulation.
According to the practice of advanced
health care systems abroad, the role of gov-
ernment public health departments is that of
planner, determining the goals and macro-
level planning of health services. Moreover,
in various domains of specialized health care
services, regulation, redress of complaints,
and administration should also be specialized
and relatively independent of the government.
Although these branches are subject to the
public health department, this subordination
is defined by relevant laws. For example, in
Britain and Hongkong, it is the bureau of
hospital administration, an independent and
professional organization established in ac-
cordance with the law,2  rather than the pub-
lic health department that directly adminis-
ters hospitals. Such an organization is usu-
ally funded by government and has its func-
tions defined by law. Its goal is to raise
effic iency,  with social equity as  a
precondition. This has the following obvi-
ous advantages: clear assessment goals for
health care institutions; cooperative supervi-
s ion by the government,  health care
institutions, and the general public; high
transparency; and  enhanced public
confidence. At the same time, in regulatory
work, the division of labor is clear and
detailed: personnel qualifications, standard-
ized equipment, and clinical procedures are
all authenticated and supervised by a spe-
cialized body. Independent redress of griev-
ances is not only the watchdog of regulation
but also the ultimate and most direct channel
the general public can resort to. In sum, di-
versified government agencies are respon-
sible for different tasks; the division of re-
sponsibility is clear, and each is clear about
legal jurisdiction and responsibility. In this
way, not only can each agency fulfill its duty
independently and successfully, but together
they form a system of checks and balances,
constraints and incentives.
III. A General Analysis of the Lack of
Effectiveness in China’s Health Care
Administration
Public health administration in China is
far from mature. This is because the whole
society is permeated by the idea of the su-
premacy of officialdom, an ideology which
is direct opposition to management science
which recognizes only scientific exploration,
facts, and efficiency. Moreover, the concept
of business administration has so far been
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barely popularized in China. Additionally,
public health administration is particularly
specialized and complex. Therefore, the pres-
ence of ideological obs tacles  is  not
unexpected.
Up to now, jurisdiction at all levels of
government has been determined by official
rank, rather than by specialized functions.
To make the matter worse, there is no sci-
entific personnel management system in
China at present to recruit truly qualified and
talented persons to fill administrative posts.
That is why the director of a health bureau
may be incapable of exercising authority over
hospital directors, why a local department
of medicine inspection may be unable to con-
trol the pricing of medicine, and why a local
public health bureau may be unable to su-
pervise public health. When the relation be-
tween the parties exercising administration
and those being administered is abnormal,
regulation can only be futile.
The instances referred to above serve
as an illustration of the most commonly seen
mechanism underlying “dysfunctional regu-
lation”: a defective governance framework.
As neither the subject of regulation (hospitals)
nor the regulator (a governmental agency) is
fully developed, it is difficult to set up a
framework of public administration, let alone
regulation and management. Therefore, regu-
lation must follow governance, and gover-
nance presupposes the development of the
parties concerned.
Fig. 1 Entities involved in health care services and their relationships
The first step in regulation is a smooth
governance relationship. After that, attention
should be focused on major stakeholders —
patients, health care institutions (including
hospitals in cities, towns and township, and
rural clinics), various supervisory agencies
(including government organizations and in-
termediary outfits inside and outside the
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market), and investors (the government, so-
cial insurance institutions, commercial insur-
ance institutions, and individuals). In a word,
the implementation of governance should
abide by the following guiding principles: (1)
the actors involved ought to be clearly
defined; (2) the scope of power or of re-
sponsibility ought to be clearly defined; (3)
each defined goal is explicitly assigned to a
department; and (4) each actor is assigned a
specific task, with corresponding power and
responsibilities.
Figure 1 presents two diagrams that
serve to illustrate the interrelations of all the
parties in health care. The diagram on the
left is a conventional version of such
interrelations, while the diagram on the right
summarizes the interrelations between inde-
pendent actors. The diagram on the right
shows the thrust of health care governance
in which funding bodies, managers, regula-
tors and health care institutions are distinct,
so that each of the four parties becomes an
independent actor accountable for perfor-
mance in relation to its assigned goal.
Note: This table is borrowed from K. Walshe, Regulating Health Care: A Prescription for Improvement?
Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2003, with adaptation and enrichment.
Table 2 Most commonly seen problems of unsuccessful regulation
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The greatest obstacle to achieving this
is administrators. In present-day China di-
verse government departments exercise vari-
ous forms of control over the health sector.
Power over investment, human resources
and distribution boils down to management
power. Why should entities with manage-
ment skills be separated from hospitals? The
separation means it’s not possible to “gain
power and have one’s orders carried out
immediately.” At the same time, though hos-
pitals may call for decentralization in a gen-
eral sense, when they really need to take re-
sponsibility they often hide behind their man-
agers to deflect criticism. Therefore it is im-
portant to clearly define hospitals’ power and
responsibilities in addition to establishing a
clearly defined framework of governance.
Only in this way can we resolve the first
category of commonly seen problems of in-
effective regulation, as listed in Table 2: lack
of accountability, dependency and capture.
Apart from rationalizing the governance
framework, the second category of fre-
quently seen problems in the regulation of
health care in China involves incompetence,
whether this be in terms of professional
competence, information and communi-
cation, or understanding. Because they lack
the skills to manage the situation, managers
are often deceived, and are unable to set
standards for hospitals and doctors. Rais-
ing the level of competence is a long-term
task, requiring systematic training and
study. We should concentrate on exploring
the best approach to regulation rather than
wasting time on the game of systems and
interests.
IV. Choice of Regulatory System in
China’s Health Sector
Choice of regulatory system hinges on
the institutional choices of the health care
sector. For example, the American health care
system places a high value both on individual
choice and market competition. Thus regu-
lation is carried out through specialized agen-
cies’ assessment and certifying of hospitals
and the constraints of consumer choice. In
countries (such as the UK, Sweden, Norway,
and Australia) or regions (such as Hong
Kong) with a system of health care services
that serves the whole population, the focus
of regulation in the health sector is on both
the costs and effects of health care provided
to the general public. Regulation consists
primarily in monitoring cost-efficiency and
controlling the input of funds and the rev-
enue of the hospitals to realize quality control.
Regulation entails very high operational
costs, because it involves simultaneous con-
trol over the amount, quality, and pricing of
health care services, entailing high informa-
tion costs and an adequate supply of spe-
cialized regulatory personnel. Therefore it is
necessary that the number of subjects of
regulation be limited to a “manageable” range
that is clearly defined in textbooks on
management. Choice of regulatory mecha-
nism is constrained by cost. In the US, regu-
lation is widely dispersed, while a more cen-
tralized approach is adopted in the UK. Brit-
ish hospitals are under the management of a
total of 300 health care foundations.
Systematic regulatory institutions have
yet to be set up in the health care sector in
China. The present system is the legacy of
the planned economy and is characterized
by rigid government control in the absence
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of specialized management. This legacy now
clashes with the current health care system,
where the outward semblance of a public
institution masks the pursuit of private
interests, so that its every act attracts
criticism.
The establishment in China of a system
of regulation calls in the first place for a
choice for health care system and social
policy to sustain this system. Should it be a
completely market-oriented or semi-market-
oriented system, or a unified nationwide state
system? It does not look as if either would
work in China. However, there is another
alternative: universal coverage in primary
health care coexisting with both public and
commercial provision of other health care
services. This choice presupposes two lay-
ers of medical service with two operational
models, which requires a regulatory system
suited to this dual character.
Therefore, it can be clearly seen that in
the course of creating a regulatory system
in China, the first difficult question consists
in determining which type of health care in-
stitution meets China’s needs. The second
is the cost of regulation. For example, in
constructing a rural primary health network,
many experts have insisted that the govern-
ment has to pay for the services of all rural
doctors. However, the vertical regulation of
millions of doctors in rural health institutions
to achieve the not easily quantifiable goal of
effective primary health care would cost an
astronomical sum well beyond the capacity
of local finance. Regulating dispersed indi-
vidual farming households under a market
system is totally different from managing
barefoot (rural) doctors under the planned
system.
To sum up, taking into account the fac-
tors constraining the creation of a regula-
tory system, if we choose a dual system of
universal primary health service plus public
and commercial health care services, we will
need a corresponding low-cost regulatory
system. This may be a normative choice to
achieve the goal of health equity in China.
The first step in reaching the goal is to de-
fine regulation legally and create regulatory
institutions. It may be necessary to set up
independent and specialized regulatory sys-
tems at the central, provincial and county
levels. The next step is to reform the human
resource system of public health agencies,
making them independent subjects of regu-
lation with full discretion in personnel affairs.
The third step consists in structural reform
involving survival of the fittest. The heads
of public hospitals should be appointed by
people’s congress at various levels, rather
than the government, so as to provide a legal
foundation for regulation. The final step is
to design and implement a set of regulatory
rules and systems.
The establishment of an independent
regulatory agency for public health care in-
stitutions facilitates governance in the fol-
lowing ways:
(1) It provides a platform for actors
(government departments , health care
institutions, social insurance organizations,
and patients) to coordinate their interests, so
that their respective responsibilities and goals
in resource management may be clearly
defined.
(2) With joint planning and clearly de-
fined goals, the resources of government
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departments and public health care institu-
tions can be pooled to develop service and
managerial systems that can satisfy social
and professional needs. Barriers between
various public health care institutions may
be eliminated to allow greater mobility for
medical personnel.
(3) Setting up an accountability mecha-
nism at a high level requires heads of regula-
tory agencies and public health care institu-
tions to be responsible for the performance
of their respective agencies.
(4) Setting up specialized competencies
and communication mechanisms and collect-
ing information will counteract the informa-
tion advantage possessed by public health
care institutions. The workload of public
health care institutions will be determined and
their performance assessed, with interven-
tion if necessary. At the same time, relevant
information will be provided to the public so
that they can participate in supervision. There
will be more information on the use of health
care resources, leading to fairer and more
efficient resource allocation.
The establishment of an independent
regulatory agency for public health care in-
stitutions by no means implies carving off
part of the existing health care department
and giving it space and equipment, creating
another organization. Rather, it should be an
independent agency with the status of a le-
gal person parallel to government adminis-
trative departments. The setting up of such
a body does not have an explicit legal basis
in China, although there are analogous
organizations. They include market interme-
diaries such as law firms, accounting firms,
and auditing firms. In order to protect the
public interest, it is not appropriate to regis-
ter them as enterprises, nor are they non-
profit or volunteer organizations. However,
they are the core of civil society. Without
them, the public interests of society would
be left without real protection and the public
would lose their confidence in society.
An independent regulatory agency for
public health care institutions is a non-mar-
ket organization committed to enforcing rules
and regulations. Although this kind of inde-
pendent organization has already existed in
other countries for years, its transplantation
into China involves organizational innovations
that must be accompanied by policy and sys-
tem innovations. In relation to correcting the
marketization trend in health care it serves
as a sword that, coming from outside, is yet
able to pierce the vitals of the medical system.
In a word, the absence of a regulatory sys-
tem is not the critical factor bringing about
the dilemma in China’s health sector.
However, the establishment of a regulatory
system that fits in with a two-layer health
care system but also operates at a relatively
low cost may open the door to a new health
care system not only for today but also for
the future. Of course, this innovation will
not be easy, mainly because the dominating
ideology in China at present is not pragmatic
“managerialism” but the pre-eminence of
officialdom.
One last point we would like to make is
that regulation is not omnipotent. In China in
transition, innumerable complex factors add
more unpredictability and uncertainty to
health care situations and health care behav-
ior that are already complicated enough.
Generally speaking, regulation is a kind of
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1. According to “the 3rd Nationwide Health Care
Survey,” investments made by the state in
medical institutions across the country in-
creased in the last five years, enlarging the total
amount of health care resources. The percent-
age of hospitals benefiting from the increased
investment also rose in the last five years. Find-
ings from the survey indicate that the total
amount of expenditure on health care by all
levels of government nationwide in 2003 was
30% higher than in 1997. However, as a per-
centage of total expenditure on health care it
fell from 89.9% in 1997 to 88.4% in 2002.
These investments went mainly to hospitals,
clinics and hospitals of traditional Chinese
medicine. 80% of the health care investments
of different levels of government went to the
cities, and of this sum 80% went to large urban
hospitals. But owing to financing difficulties,
slow progress was made in areas such as pre-
ventive health care, basic health care services,
and rural health, despite the fact that they pro-
vide greater social benefit.
2. Since there can be clashes of interests between
health care services and preventive health care
or health promotion, public health is placed
under the jurisdiction of an independent gov-
ernment body.
managerial technique already in existence and
continually evolving. It will not be able to
exert a crucial influence unless it is integrated
with elements of social policy such as the
social environment, social culture and the par-
ticipation of the general public.
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